Adam Hinshelwood has transformed York City from National League relegation candidates into title challengers! A dozen new signings have arrived for the league leaders since the start of pre-season as Hinshelwood was well-backed financially, but what are the underlying tactical principles beneath York’s success?
This article aims to answer that question. Below, I’ll analyse York’s style of play and determine why Hinshelwood’s tactical approach has played a huge part in their transformation.
Build-up
Hinshelwood sets York up in a 4-1-4-1 formation, but there is an awful lot of fluidity with regards to how they build play from defence. York’s base shape is a 4-2-4 build, with their #6 (Dan Batty) and a #8 (usually Alex Hunt) sitting ahead of their back-four – as we can see below.
Interestingly, though, the make-up of York’s front-four differs from how you’d usually expect.
York’s other #8, Marvin Armstrong or Ricky Aguiar, pushes high alongside their centre-forward. With Ollie Pearce often preferred as the #9 to the more physical Dipo Akinyemi or Lenell John-Lewis, this leaves York without a recognised target-man on the pitch.
As such, it is the responsibility of York’s wingers to stretch the pitch horizontally and vertically, with the two central players given the freedom to drop deeper. This shape is illustrated in the below image.
The benefit of having these two ‘false-nines’ is that they can be incredibly difficult to track.
If opponents position their central-midfielders deeper to track these forward players when they drop into the midfield, it can give them fewer players high up the pitch themselves in order to apply pressure to York’s build-up.
However if sides task their centre-backs with man-marking Pearce and Armstrong/Aguiar, they can easily be dragged out of position and leave gaps in their defensive line. We can see this last point in action within the below image.
But it’s not just the positioning of York’s ‘false-nines’ which creates problems for their opponents during the build-up phase.
When they look to ‘play out’ from goal-kicks, York’s #6, Batty, can drop deeper, in-between the two centre-backs. Their goalkeeper, Harrison Male, acts as a situational centre-back to form a back-four; the centre-backs split; and their full-backs push slightly forwards into the second line either side of the remaining pivot player, Hunt.
This creates a 4-3-4 shape from goal-kicks (below), with the front-four as previously detailed.
From open-play, York can still form this shape without Male acting as an additional centre-back. In this instance, York form a 3-3-4 shape during their high build (below).
The significance of this build-up shape rests on Batty’s ability to drop deeper to act as a ‘quarterback’. Here, he can easily find time and space on the ball as he’s very difficult to press as York transition from a 4-2-4 build to a 3-3-4. For instance, if opponents use two strikers to press both of York’s centre-backs, Batty can drop deeper to give them an overload.
In addition to his tactical understanding, Batty also has top technical quality to help York retain possession, and has the ability to play big switch passes out to York’s wingers (below) who are positioned high and wide.
If the opposition used a midfielder to man-mark Batty instead, they would be under-resourced in central-midfield once he pressed forwards, and York would have space available to exploit further up the pitch.
Additionally, with York having width-holders in all three lines (their split centre-backs, their full-backs, and their wingers), it makes it impossible for the opposition to adequately mark them all whilst also ensuring they are compact centrally.
As a result, these full-backs can often find space once a winger has pressed forwards to apply pressure to a centre-back.
All of this fluidity to Hinshelwood’s build-up structure (the #6 dropping in-between the centre-backs, the full-backs pushing on, and the false-nines dropping into the midfield from the last line) makes York the most difficult side to press in the division.
There’s so much unpredictability and movement that it makes it incredibly difficult to prepare to face York from an opposition perspective. This has led to York averaging the National League’s second-highest possession share (63.8%) – because they’re so hard to get the ball off!
However when Batty drops into the first line, York’s remaining pivot player can be isolated. Below, we can see Hunt on the ball after York had progressed from defence. However with the full-backs out wide to create space for him, there is a lack of proximity centrally.
This means that the distances between the players are great, potentially leading to turnovers if York don’t have the technical quality available to retain possession. One potential consequence of this is that, in the event of a turnover of possession, York may be vulnerable in defensive transition as the midfield has been emptied.
Also, although York’s fluid build-up shape allows them to find time and space on the ball, if they are rushed into playing long passes from defence, and the midfield has been emptied, York are likely to be unsuccessful in the subsequent loose-ball duels that occur. This, again, means that they may be vulnerable in the transitional moment.
Attack
However, it’s not just during the build-up when York’s fluidity is on display.
Ryan Fallowfield, a natural right-back, is often deployed as the right-sided centre-back within York’s back-four. As such, he is comfortable pushing up the pitch slightly which, in turn, allows Joe Felix to move high and wide into the last line. Consequently, York’s right winger can invert into a more central area, as illustrated below.
This movement is again difficult to track, as who is supposed to mark the winger? If the left-back follows him, space will be created for Felix to exploit; but if he’s left free, York may have a central overload.
In fact, both full-backs on either side of the pitch have the freedom to join the attack for York. This allows them to regularly combine with their wingers, and York can create overloads in the wide areas with ease.
Additionally, with either or both full-backs able to join the attack, York can frequently attack with five or even six players in the last line.
This allows them to overload opposition defensive lines (5v4 or 6v5), and flood the opposition penalty area, giving them a greater chance of success when the ball is crossed into the box, as we can see below.
York’s deeper #8, let’s say Alex Hunt, is also given the freedom to join the attacks.
Below, versus Barnet, we can see how Hunt moved outside the block to help overload the wide area. He then made a forward run beyond Barnet’s defence, went untracked by a defender, and crossed the ball which lead to York’s first goal of the match.
This is another example of where Hinshelwood’s coaching ability is demonstrated.
On the occasions that Hunt pushes forwards into the attack, the higher #8 has to drop into his original position to ensure the midfield isn’t completely emptied, as we can see below with Aguiar deeper. This requires great tactical understanding, and stems from Hinshelwood’s coaching.
However, on the occasions where the midfield is completely emptied, York may be vulnerable.
In these moments, there is often a lack of occupation in the midfield to help progress if play has been forced backwards; and, in the event of a turnover, York may become vulnerable in defensive transition with no central occupation.
Additionally, the positioning of York’s full-backs may also leave them open.
As we can see below, Felix, who is now playing as the left-back, had inverted into the midfield versus Halifax Town to provide proximity to the central-midfielder. However, he had his back to his opponent and was unable to see him.
After the ball was turned over on the half-way line, Halifax attacked at pace towards York’s goal. Felix’s opponent was able to make a forward run into the penalty area to get on the end of the move and score, with Felix not even in the below picture as the shot was taken.
Out-of-possession
We’ve covered how York build play from defence, why this makes them difficult to press, and how they’re afforded the freedom to get forwards and attack. But how does Hinshelwood set his York side up when they’re out-of-possession?
York press in man-to-man fashion right the way across the pitch from opposition goal-kicks, as illustrated by the below image versus Barnet.
York also press aggressively, man-to-man, during open-play.
Against Barnet, who built play in a 3-2-5 shape, York’s wingers and centre-forward pressed the back-three; their two #8’s marked the double-pivot; and their #6, Batty, man-marked a Barnet #10 who had pushed into the last line.
This meant that Batty, a natural midfielder, often had to position himself in the last line of defence for York during the high press moment. Conversely, a York centre-back had to step into the midfield in order to press the other Barnet #10 if he dropped deeper, man-marking him.
This pressing structure of York’s is seen below. In fact, this actually led to York’s third and final goal of the match against Barnet in a 3-1 victory.
The reason York press in man-to-man fashion high up the pitch is in order to limit the amount of time their opponents spend with the ball.
Having possession yourself is only half the goal for a possession-based side like Adam Hinshelwood’s York City. If you’re not aggressive enough out-of-possession, it becomes difficult to exert optimal control on matches through possession.
York have the second-most aggressive press in the National League, allowing their opponents on average just 8.75 passes per defensive action (PPDA) they make.
When York are forced to defend deeper once their press has been beaten, they defend in a 4-1-4-1 block with Batty sitting in-between the back-four and midfield.
York have conceded a league-best of just 9 goals against from their opening 16 matches, and have allowed an expected goals against (xGA) figure of 14.93 – ranking them 4th. York have also only faced an average of 7.55 shots against per 90 minutes – the fifth-fewest in the division.
However, this back-four of York’s can be overloaded.
Versus Barnet, who pushed their wing-backs high and wide to stretch the pitch, a #10 was found free between the lines. Barnet managed to create a wide overload with their right wing-back. This led to Barnet’s goal.
Here’s another example. Below, versus Woking, we can see how York’s right-back had been dragged out wide. Their right-sided centre-back moved out wide slightly to support him. However this left just two defensive players centrally to defend the penalty area once the cross had been delivered.
Woking had two players within the width of the goal who were occupying York’s remaining defenders, so a deep cross to the back post found a Woking attacker unmarked.
And here’s another example of how the positioning of York’s full-backs can be exposed…
When a full-back jumps to press, York’s #6 often has to plug the gaps left in the defensive line. This means that they can be vulnerable against opposing midfielders who make runs from deep.
As we can see below, York’s left-back, Cameron John, had been forced to press forwards. Batty had to track the run from deep, but this was difficult for him to do so. As a result, the attacker could easily meet the through pass and cross the ball into the penalty area.
However, even after defending deep, York have top players who can get them up the pitch who are also a threat in transition. Tyrese Sinclair, Ashley Nathaniel-George, Callum Harriott and Billy Chadwick give them great depth in the wide areas; and Ollie Pearce also offers a threat in transition from a more central position.
Conclusion
To summarise, Adam Hinshelwood has implemented an incredibly well-drilled, fluid build-up structure at York City, which is very difficult to press. The fluidity of his system combined with the technical quality of his squad makes York, in my opinion, the most difficult side in the National League to press.
Out-of-possession, York press in aggressive man-to-man fashion all the way across the pitch in the high press, to apply maximum pressure on their opponents’ build-up.
These two points – how they build play and how they press – enable York to exert optimal control on matches consistently and, together with their quality in the final-third, it’s no surprise to see them challenging right towards the top of the division. This ability to control matches both with and without the ball is conducive to consistently controlling matches and challenging for league titles.
However, for balance, I do believe that their structure can be exploited in defensive transition once they have forced the opposition back into their own half, due to the lack of proximity in central areas and the freedom a lot of their players have to support the attack. Once they’ve been forced to defend deep, I also believe that their back-four can be exploited for the reasons mentioned earlier.
These potential weaknesses may become more evident if York suffer a number of injuries to key players, or if they move up the pyramid and the requirements of Hinshelwood’s squad increases, and they aren’t able to exert as much control.
However, these doubts are almost irrelevant at the moment – they’re top of the division! York are undoubtedly a top, top side. They’re difficult to press, difficult to ‘play out’ against, consistently control matches with and without the ball, and have match-winners all across the pitch.
Adam Hinshelwood has proven himself to be a top manager, and I’ll look forward to following his journey with York City with great interest.
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